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The real estate industry has been one of China’s pillar industries over the last two decades, but 
soaring housing prices and overheated investments have hindered the sustainable development 
of the economy. Land transfer fee is a critical determinant of housing prices under the current 
land reserve system in China and also the main revenue resource for local governments. The 
reliance of local governments on land-leasing fees as their dominant source of revenue is 
usually referred as “land finance”，which started from fiscal decentralization and tax sharing 
reform in 1990s and created a mismatch between revenue distribution and expenditure 
responsibility for local governments. This study analyzes the hypothesis that the degree of 
fiscal decentralization and the land finance phenomenon are important factors causing China’s 
soaring housing prices. In addition, land finance is the intermediate variable linking tax reform 
and high housing prices. Using panel data covering 31 provinces and municipality cities in 
China from 2000 to 2009, the research finds that enlarged fiscal decentralization caused by the 
reform of the tax-sharing system is an indispensable institutional factor leading to the rapid rise 
of housing prices. This study presents a comprehensive influence mechanism of fiscal 
decentralization on housing price, contributing to the understanding of local governments’ 
behavior and provides recommendations for the future urban development. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In 1998, in order to address the impact of Asian financial turmoil, China's State Council decide 
to end the welfare housing system and develop real estate industry as one of pillars of China’s 
economy. Since the 1990s, China’s real estate industry has entered an unprecedented period of 
development and housing prices have continued to rise. The contribution rate of the real estate 
industry to gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016 was 12%（National Bureau of Statistics, 
2016）. Data from the China Statistical Yearbook (1991-1995) show that the national average 
housing price in 1995, shortly after the Tax-Sharing Reform of 1994, was nearly twice that of 
1991, while the average housing price in 2009 was almost six times that of 1991 (Figure1). 
Rapidly rising housing prices are fast becoming a potential problem for sustainable 
development, social harmony, and economic progress. For the majority of homebuyers, 
excessively high housing prices are unbearable burdens, and most prospective homebuyers are 












Figure 1. The change of Commodity Building selling average price of 31 provinces 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 
 
The cost of land is a critical determinant of housing prices. In 2014, taxes related to land and 
real estate accounted for 80% of commercial housing prices, of which the land tax alone 
accounted for 54%(National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Thus, land has been chiefly 
responsible for the increase in housing prices. The fees paid because of land transfers comprise 
roughly half of the general budget of local governments. Coupled with tax revenues related to 
real estate, the finance received from land forms a core element of the income that local 
governments receive. Thus, in the design of the land finance system, local governments and 
developers are the beneficiaries of rising housing prices, and they are behind the current sky-
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home more affordable and stabilize financial market, local governments generally do not have 
to make any counter-cyclical adjustments when housing prices rise. Instead, they introduce 
stimulus policies when the financial market is in recession. To a certain extent, local 
governments and real estate developers have become common stakeholders. In recent years, 
the central government has introduced many macro-control measures to stabilize housing 
prices1; nonetheless, these measures have failed to effectively curb the trend of soaring prices.  
 
The local governments “land finance” 2  development mode started after tax sharing reform 
in 1994, which created a gap between tax revenue local governments received and 
infrastructure construction expenditure they were responsible for. This fiscal decentralization 
reform forced local governments to find new income source to make the ends meet. With the 
end of welfare housing policy and notion wide housing reform introduced in late the 1990s, 
China’s real estate market embraced a rapid growth. In the process of real estate development, 
the huge land conveyance fee is exclusively owned by local government in China, which began 
to become the main revenue source. Besides, under the pressure of GDP competition, almost 
all local government increased investment in urban construction and accelerated the process of 
urbanization. Therefore, local governments began to sell more land to real estate developers 
                                                 
1 The State Council of China have taken many measures to control housing prices. The purchase restriction is on of these 
measures, which firmly restrict identity of the purchasers, number of houses residents can buy, and ratio of down payment. 
2 In a narrow sense, land finance refers to the reliance of local governments on land-leasing fees as their dominant source of 
revenue. In a broad sense, land finance refers to the tax revenues that are indirectly related to land, mainly stemming from 






and use the land revenue as the fuel of city construction. While the high land value helped local 
government relieve the pressure of fiscal deficit, it dramatically pushed up the housing prices. 
 
In this study, tax system reforms, land finance, and housing prices are combined in the same 
analytic framework to study the institutional factors that contribute to China’s increasing 
housing prices. Based on a theoretical analysis of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and housing prices in the context of the tax-sharing system and using a panel 
data covering 31 provinces in China from 2000 to 2009, this study conducted an empirical 
analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and housing prices. Using a stability 
test model and robustness test, the study confirms that the large degree of fiscal decentralization 
was a non-negligible institutional factor that caused the rapid increase in housing prices. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 analyzes the existing literature in 
fiscal decentralization and fluctuation of housing price. Chapter 3 conducts a theoretical 
analysis of the influence of fiscal decentralization on housing prices and proposes the research 
hypothesis for the study. Chapter 4 establishes an indicator for land finance and fiscal 
decentralization and presents a description of the data. Chapter 5 empirically explores the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization, land finance, and housing prices. Chapter 6 







Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Although there are lots of literature on fiscal decentralization in academic circles, few focus on 
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and housing price. Most of the research focuses 
on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth and local government 
behavior. 
Fiscal decentralization in China is much the same as elsewhere in the world, which is about the 
division of financial and administrative powers between central and local governments. After 
the reform of the financial system, the relationship between central and local governments has 
changed from "compulsory" to "negotiating a contract," and the relationship between local 
governments has changed from "friendly" to "competitive” (Gao, 2006). 
 
The redistribution of fiscal power and responsibility is believed to have the ability to increase 
economic efficiency. Bahl and Linn pointed out that fiscal decentralization can create 
horizontal competition among local governments. Local governments are forced to optimize 
resources allocation and improve the efficiency of government affairs and thus promote the 
development of the local economy. This competition mechanism encourages local governments 
to innovate their systems to adapt to the development of the local economy (Bahl and Linn). 






central government, they can provide public goods and services that needed most by residents 
(Oates, 1972). Moreover, when local governments are responsible for providing public services, 
they will be supervised by local voters. As a result, they have greater incentive to fulfill their 
financial responsibility for the best interests of the public (Shah& Qureshi, 1994). Zhang and 
Gao used provincial panel data to analyze the competition between local governments and 
found that the transformation of the fiscal system helped increase investment in local 
infrastructure, thus explaining why China has good infrastructure (Zhang & Gao, 2007). 
However, there are also scholars who question the fiscal decentralization’s effects on economic 
development. Prud challenged whether local government should be better informed even if 
they are elected democratically (Prud, 1995). Furthermore, Lin and Liu suggested that local 
governments in China directly own most of the local enterprises and are inclined to make trade 
barriers in the face of local principle competition to protect their markets, this may cause 
problems like rent-seeking and efficiency losses (Lin & Liu, 2000) 
 
In recent years, China’s increasing housing prices in urban areas have become the focus of 
scholars, both in China and abroad. Extensive studies have been conducted to explore the 
influencing mechanisms of housing prices. Liu and Shen (2004) highlighted that the growth of 
urban housing prices cannot be explained by economic fundamentals or historical 






as well as changes in housing prices and interest rates exert a significant influence on housing 
prices. Kuang (2010) pointed out that expectations and speculation can explain the fluctuating 
housing prices in China. Changes in interest rates have the greatest influence on the fluctuation 
of housing prices, while development costs are not important influencers. 
 
The findings from the extant literature in relation to this topic show that existing research has 
discussed the various factors that have led to the rapid increase in urban housing prices in China. 
In this study, we argue that against the background of the tax-sharing system, the gradual 
increase in fiscal decentralization and the phenomenon of land finance are the main reasons for 
China’s escalating housing prices. Mei (2010) indicated that in China’s current transition 
period, local governments are agents of the central government, with inconsistent economic 
rights and responsibilities. This greatly influences urban housing prices. Wu and Zhang (2011) 
argued that China’s tax reform is incomplete, resulting in the finances of local governments 
being significantly stretched. To overcome their financial difficulties, local governments are 
reliant on obtaining money through land finance. 
 
Based on existing research, we find that the tax-sharing system has a significant impact on 
local government revenue and leads to local problems in relation to land finance. Land finance 






The majority of existing studies in this field are based on descriptive analyses and lack 
quantitative analyses; they also have some deficiencies in terms of their variables and 
estimation methods. In this study, besides theoretical deductions, indicators of fiscal 
decentralization and land finance are developed to test the impact of the tax-sharing system on 
urban housing prices. Given the relationship between the tax system and housing prices, a 
realistic remedy to correct China’s escalating property bubble has to be firmly rooted in policies 
that reform land finance and improve the fiscal incentives of local governments. 
 
Chapter 3 Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis 
The Relationship between Tax-Sharing Reforms and Land Finance  
The Tax-Sharing Reform  
China has implemented many reforms to its tax system, including a tax reform in the 1980s 
that adjusted financial distribution between local and central governments. Under the Tax 
Farming System 3, local governments pay only a fixed amount of fiscal revenue annually. By 
reducing the local corporate tax, some local governments have reaped the rewards of economic 
development. This placed the central government in a serious crisis in the late 1980s. During 
                                                 
3 Under the tax farming system, local governments collect tax locally and transfer all the revenue the central government 






this period, the financial burden of the central government increased significantly due to their 
decrease in fiscal revenue shares of GDP, central budgetary revenues, and total budgetary 
revenues. In order to overcome these financial difficulties, the central government introduced 
a tax-sharing reform in 1994. This represented an important adjustment to the market economy 
following China’s previous socialist market economy.4  
 
The objective of intruding tax-sharing system in 1994 was to reassert the central power of 
economic control by transferring local revenue to the central government (Wong, 2000). Under 
the tax-sharing system, four dimensions of change were introduced: adjustment of tax 
categories, establishment of shared tax category, standardization of tax rate, and introduction 
of bi-level tax collection (Zhao& Zhang, 1999). Under the reform, taxes were divided into three 
categories, including central tax, local tax and shared tax (Table1). The most notable adjustment 
that fundamentally changed the fiscal relationship between central and local government was 
transferring of the consumption tax and value-added tax from local to central or shared tax5. 
The consumption tax was imposed on the sales of tobacco and used to be the main tax source 
for local government, and the value-added tax was gathered from the process commodity 
production to circulation. After the reform the sum of these two taxed amounted to 242.6 billion 
yuan accounting for 40 percent of total central revenue (Ministry of Finance 1996). 
                                                 
4 For more on this topic, see Chen (2010), who provides a detailed review of the context of the tax-sharing system. 






Table 1. Three Categories of Taxes under the Tax-Sharing System 
Designation Kinds of Taxes 
Central taxes 
① Custom duties, custom-levied consumption, and value-added 
taxes 
② Consumption tax 
③ Business, income, and urban construction taxes from railways, 
central banks, and insurance companies 
④ Income taxes from local and foreign-invested banks and other 
financial institutions licensed by the People's Bank of China 
⑤ Profits remitted from centrally owned enterprises 
Local taxes 
① Business tax 
② Locally owned enterprise income tax and industrial income tax 
③ Urban land use tax and real estate tax 
④ Fixed-asset investment adjustment and urban construction tax 
⑤ Vehicle and vessel use tax, stamp tax, and butcher tax 
⑥ Agricultural and animal husbandry tax, special agricultural 
product use tax, and farm and use taxes 
⑦ Contract tax, inheritance tax, and property gains tax 
⑧ Profits remitted from locally owned enterprises 
Shared taxes 
① Value-added tax: central government (75 percent) and local 
government (25 percent) 
② Stock transaction gains tax: central government (50 percent) and 
local government (50 percent)  
③ Resource tax (except offshore oil resource tax): mostly to local 
government 
Source. Decentralization Reforms and Regionalism in China: A Review, by Zhao, X.B (1999), International 










Figure 2 Illustration of tax sharing reform  
 
The reform of the tax-sharing system meant that financial revenue is centralized, while 
expenditure responsibilities are decentralized. After the tax-sharing reform of 1994, the central 
government implemented a successful system of fiscal revenue distribution, but the 
adjustments to fiscal expenditure policies were limited. Governments at provincial level and 
below were responsible for providing social welfare and public services. 
 
Affected by the tax-sharing reform, the proportion of local fiscal revenue to national fiscal 
revenue dropped from 77.98% in 1993 to 44.30% in 1994 6. The proportion of local to national 
expenditure declined slightly, from 71.74% to 69.72%7 . This inequality between local and 
                                                 
6 Data on local government revenue is from the website of National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China 
[NBS] at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/ 
7 Data on local government revenue is from the website of National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China 






national government in terms of administrative and financial power has continued to this day. 
In 2015, local fiscal revenue accounted for 54.52% of national fiscal revenue, while local 
expenditure accounted for 85.46% of national expenditure 8. The reform of the tax distribution 
system in 1994 rendered the ability of local governments to be financially self-sufficient 
decrease sharply. The gap between revenue and expenditure in the budgets of local 
governments is extensive. In addition to seeking financial transfer payments from the central 
government, local governments are forced to obtain funds through land finance. 
 
The tax-sharing reform drove local governments to seek revenue from land. The reform in 1994 
allocated all income from urban land use, value-added tax from land, and property tax to local 
governments (Ministry of Finance 1996). These initiatives led to a direct relationship between 
local governments, land development, real estate, and construction. The development of 
services is closely related to large-scale land development and infrastructure investment; this 
reinforces the significance of land finance. In China, business taxes related to various services, 
such as entertainment, hotels, and restaurants, were also allocated to local governments.  
 
                                                 
8 Data on local government revenue is from the website of National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China 






Land reserve system   
On April 30, 2001, the State Council of People Republic of China issued a circular to strengthen 
the management of state-owned land, which means that China's urban land reserve system was 
established at the national level. Under this system, the government dominates the structure, 
time and quantity of land supply, and has become a unique land supplier. Multiple sources of 
land supply have become a single source. The system has been completed since 2007, which 
means that China's urban government has completely controlled the supply of urban land（Li, 
2012）. 
 
The current system of land and property rights gives local governments substantial control over 
land, thus enabling them to expropriate and change land use at a low cost. Following the 
implementation of the Land Management Law of the People’s Republic of China in 1986 and 
the Urban Real Estate Management Law of the People’s Republic of China in 1994, China’s 
market of land trading formed, paving the way for the sale of land by local governments. After 
the reform of the tax distribution system in 1994, the central government no longer participated 
in the distribution of rights and interests in relation to land transfer, and the funds from land 
transfers were included in the income of local governments. Under pressure from unbalanced 
local fiscal revenues and expenditure following the tax-sharing system, it was the natural 








Local Governments’ GDP Competition   
In China, economic growth has been a crucial measure that the central government uses to 
assess local governments, and a successful assessment has often led to the promotion of local 
government officials. In the local GDP competition, high growth needs high investment, high 
investment needs high financing, and high financing needs land finance. This has resulted in 
the formation of a unique GDP Competition mechanism in China. Under this evaluation and 
incentive mechanism, local government officials pay close attention to the relative economic 




Land finance refers to the income obtained by local governments through land management, 
which includes land-transfer fees based on the transfer of land ownership, various taxes related 
to land transfer, and income from land mortgages. The formation of land finance in China can 






centralization that changed the central and local governments’ methods of fiscal distribution. 
However, the reform did not make the necessary corresponding adjustments to the powers and 
responsibilities of local governments. The reform meant that local governments were 
responsible for bearing nearly all of the construction expenditure in relation to housing; 
however, they received only half of the revenues from the new system. These fiscal inequalities 
forced local governments to rely on land-leasing fees for revenue so that they could finance 
investment in infrastructure and economic development. With the permission of the central 
government and the Land Ownership System, local governments began to manage urban land. 
Under the stimulation of the local governments’ “GDP Competition,” the real estate industry 
began to boom due to rapid urbanization. The unique phenomenon of land finance was created 
as a result of this. 
 
The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization and Land Finance  
From a historical perspective, land finance has played a decisive role in stimulating the 
government’s initiative and enthusiasm for promoting economic growth and improving the 
construction of urban–public infrastructure. Local governments were able to amass agricultural 
land at a low cost, transfer industrial land at a low price, and transfer residential land at a high 






fees to address the gap in their finances. The extensive income from land transfer that is used 
for land expropriation and demolition compensation, land development, urban construction, 
and infrastructure construction has also become an endogenous logic of China’s economic 
growth. 
 
Relieving the Pressure of Local Government Expenditure 
Following the reform of the tax distribution system, it is clear that local fiscal revenue and 
expenditure do not match. In 1994, the gap between local fiscal revenue and expenditure 
widened, from 6.1 billion yuan in 1993 to 17.27 billion yuan in 1994. This gap has not since 
been rectified. Moreover, the gap between revenue and expenditure has become wider, reaching 
6.6 billion yuan in 2015 (Ren, 2017). In order to address this gap between income and 
expenditure, local governments not only strive for transfer payments from the central 
government but also actively generate money from the land. 
 
Promoting Economic Growth 
Land finance also activates land development. By transferring the rights to use land and 






the original capital of urbanization, industrialization, and modernization. This greatly enlarges 
the scale of investment and promotes economic growth. The mode of this system can be 
summarized as managing the city (i.e., local governments first arrange for a plot of land to be 
sold at auction, and then they use the sale of that land for the construction of local 
infrastructure). After the price of the land appreciates, the prices of land in the surrounding 
areas will also rise, and local governments typically use this land to obtain more fiscal revenue, 
thus achieving double GDP growth and fiscal revenue and forming a “virtuous circle.” 
 
Speeding up the Process of Urbanization 
Local governments have the incentive to lease land to industrial and commercial enterprises at 
low prices to attract investment, develop industry and commerce, obtain future tax revenues, 
and increase GDP. After land transfer, rural areas are transformed into urban areas; villagers 
are transformed into residents; and urban–rural fringe areas and industrial parks expand 
through urban extension. After obtaining funds, local governments promote infrastructure 
construction and improve public services. This not only improves the urban landscape but also 
prepares said landscape for the next land transfer. 
 






According to the preferences of local governments, the funds obtained from land financing are 
invested in local infrastructure and industry construction. In recent years, 60–70% of 
investment funds for urban infrastructure comprise land financing loans. 
 
In view of the positive role that land finance plays, we should also understand the problems it 
brings. Among other things, it raises housing prices, causes corruption, expands unequal 
income distribution, and increases inventory. 
High Housing Inventory   
The dependence on land finance renders the reduction in high housing prices difficult in first-
and second-tier cities (Wu & Zheng, 2011). Under strong market demand and through premium 
transactions, first-tier cities can obtain high land-transfer fees with a low amount of land supply. 
In 2015, the average premium of land transactions in first-tier cities reached 27%, while the 
average premium of land transaction in third-tier and fourth-tier cities was only 8%. In 2015, 
first-tier cities issued a land area of 28.48 million square meters, a 23% reduction over the same 
period last year, while third- and fourth-tier cities issued a land area of 69.762 million square 
meters, a 14% reduction over the same period last year (Ren, 2017). 
 






and fourth-tier cities. Fiscal revenues, economic benefits, and other related interests due to land 
finance have greatly stimulated the enthusiasm of local governments for land leasing. In many 
cities, the extent of land leasing is out of control; the structure is out of balance; the proportion 
of residential, commercial, and office buildings is too high, while the supply of construction 
lands for industry and real estate is in excess of demand; the high inventory of real estate is 
also difficult to digest. 
 
The shortsighted behavior of local governments makes land supply excessive. The mutual 
rotation of local officials formed by the limited tenure system has caused this shortsighted 
behavior, which is in conflict with the necessary sustainable development of cities. The current 
government is overdrawing the fiscal revenues of future governments, and some local 
governments have consumed land rent income for the next 50–70 years in 3–5 years, thus 
leading to the excessive supply of land.  
 
As the monopolists of the land market, local governments use their dominance to obtain most 
of the “income” of the real estate industry, while developers are in a relatively open competitive 
market with limited bargaining power. The number of real estate developers in the country has 
been increasing, but the gross interest rate of the industry has steadily declined since 2011. The 







In the design of the system of land finance in China, local governments and developers are not 
only the biggest beneficiaries of rising housing prices; they are also the producers of high 
housing prices. Unless pressured by certain central regulatory measures, local governments 
generally have no counter-cyclical incentives to regulate housing prices when they rise; instead, 
they introduce stimulus policies when the housing market is depressed. 
 
Rent-Seeking Space and Social Inequality  
On one hand, local governments use the planned economy to buy land at a low price; on the 
other hand, they use the market economy to supply land at a high price, thus forming a huge 
“land price gap” to obtain financial revenue, while also creating “rent-seeking” spaces and 
opportunities for corruption. 
 
Land finance has widened the gap between urban and rural consumption in relation to both 
fiscal revenue and expenditure. From the perspective of fiscal revenue, local governments 
obtain land from farmers at a low price and then sell it at a higher price, resulting in the land 
price gap. Although this gap presents a way for local governments to manage cities and promote 






perspective of fiscal expenditure, the process of fiscal land expenditure is uneven and unfair, 
and this has a far greater impact on the consumption of urban residents than rural residents. 
 
Land finance widens the gap between rich and poor: It not only brings enormous benefits to 
local governments but also provides ways for individuals to get rich quickly. The wealth gap 
in relation to real estate cements class divide. The level of income and wealth inequality directly 
caused by land finance will continue through intergenerational transmission. This will have a 
profound impact on China’s economic development in the coming decades. 
 
The Relationship between Land Finance and Housing Prices  
Local Government: The Biggest Beneficiary  
Land price is determined by the supply and demand of the land market. The successful balance 
of supply and demand forms the foundation for a smoothly operating housing market. 
Excessive short-term supply will lead to inventory, and excessive supply will push up land and 
housing prices. 
 
The history of housing market fluctuations in Hong Kong shows that insufficient land supply 






Kong government (when under the control of Britain as a colony) has issued a sustainably 
policy of land supply, limiting land supply to fifty hectares in Hong Kong every year. This 
policy is one of the main contributors to the rapid increase in housing prices in Hong Kong 
between 1985 and 1994. The plan to limit land supply inevitably led to further shortages in 
housing supply in the market. In 2008–2009, only 10.19 hectares of new residential land were 
issued by the Hong Kong government. In 2010, only about 19,800 residential units were built 
in Hong Kong, less than a quarter of the units built in 2000 (Ren, 2017). 
 
The behavior of local governments in first-, second-, third-, and fourth-tier cities in China9 has 
also led to different consequences. In first- and second-tier cities, local government land supply 
is insufficient, with extensive capital and land shortage, resulting in high-value land 
transactions. Local governments are the biggest beneficiaries of high-value land, and first-tier 
cities can obtain high levels of transfer fees without a large supply of land. In third- and fourth-
tier cities, in order to obtain fiscal revenue, local governments still maintain a large supply of 
land in spite of the oversupply of local land, resulting in high turnover rates, excessive supply, 
and high real-estate inventory. 
 
                                                 
9 The Chinese city tier system is an unofficial hierarchical classification. Cities in different tiers reflect differences in 
consumer behavior, income level, population size, consumer sophistication, infrastructure, talent pool, and business 






The Influence of Land Finance on Housing Price  
Local governments in China are at the center of the distribution of housing interests, and their 
actions have an important, even decisive, impact on the land and real estate market, as well as 
on industrial structure, economic growth, and social welfare, as land finance plays an extremely 
important supporting role in the operation of local governments.  
 
Following the tax-sharing reform, land finance has become an important way for local 
governments to remedy the lack of fiscal revenues that normally support the operation of local 
governments. The industrial and commercial development required for the GDP competition   
are inseparable from the demand for land. Urban land-use tax, property tax, farmland tax, land 
value-added tax, and paid-use income of state-owned land are all related to land finance. Driven 
by urbanization and industrialization, local governments have extensively acquired collective 
rural land under the guise of city management. The expansion of urban environments has also 
brought prosperity to the real estate and construction industry, and this expansion has become 
the main source of revenue for local budgets. The land-transfer fee forms roughly half of local 
governments’ budget revenues. The tax associated with land and real estate accounts for nearly 
28% of local budget revenues, and the land financing balance has reached 3 trillion Chinese 
yuan (National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). For most cities and counties within China, land 






top priority for local fiscal revenue sources. 
 
As previously mentioned, land finance is an important source of revenue for local governments. 
It ensures an increase in local government revenue and solves local governments’ fiscal deficit 
problems. Land finance also guarantees the sustainability of local governments through GDP-
based evaluations. With these two incentives, local governments are likely to implement a 
series of policies to ensure that housing prices keep rising. This can be observed from the 
current soaring housing prices and the introduction of bailout policies by local governments 
following the central government’s macro-control measures. The disobedience of local 
governments has been predictable.10 The impact of these mechanisms is presented as follows: 
First, local governments actively promote and maintain high housing prices in order to obtain 
revenue from land finance. Second, local governments lack incentives to cooperate with the 
central government to stabilize housing prices due to their fiscal deficit problems. Based on the 
theoretical considerations, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: China’s taxation reform is an institutional factor that cannot be neglected when 
examining the reasons for China’s increase in housing prices. 
                                                 
10 For example, regulatory policies achieved initial results in Shanghai in the first half of 2009. However, owing to increased 
local government deficits and funding constraints, the local government introduced bailout policies to promote the 







Hypothesis 2: The fiscal decentralization of land is an intermediate variable that links the tax-
sharing system with rising housing prices. 
 
We will now explore the internal mechanism using a panel data covering 31 provinces in China 
from 2000 to 2009 and provide evidence for the abovementioned hypothesis. 
 
Chapter 4 Methodology and Data  
Indicators of Fiscal Decentralization  
 
There are extensive studies on the indicators of fiscal decentralization but there is no uniform 
choice of fiscal decentralization measurement indicators in the existing literature. Oates (1985) 
used the share of local governments’ fiscal expenditure to central government spending to 
describe the degree of fiscal decentralization. However, this method is not feasible in this study 
because central government expenditure in province level is not open in China. Lin and Liu 
(2000) used the marginal increase of local governments’ income to describe the degree of fiscal 
decentralization, but this indicator is questionable for regions in which income changes little 






approach to develop a single indicator because of varied definitions of fiscal decentralization. 
The definition of political decentralization requires full local autonomy, whereas the degree of 
local autonomy is difficult to measure with specific indicators. As discussed in chapter 3, we 
believe fiscal decentralization is the main reason that reduce the local governments’ income 
and makes them rely on land-leasing fees for revenue. Based on the purpose of this study, and 
in order to eliminate the impact of population size, we use per capita revenue as an indicator to 
measure fiscal decentralization. 
Fiscal Decentralization Level（FD）=
local per capita government revenue(LPCGR)
central per capita government revenue(CPCGR)
 
Indicators of Land Finance  
There are many types of local government land finance. According to the classification method 
used by the Ministry of Finance (CaiJian [2004] No.53), roughly, land finance types can be 
divided into land-related tax revenue and non-tax revenue. 
 
Tax revenue directly related to land belongs to government budgetary fiscal revenues. The 
current tax system involves more than 10 types of land tax, including farmland occupation tax, 
urban land-use tax, land value-added tax, and property tax. These taxes are local revenues after 
the 1994 tax reform. Tax revenues are related indirectly to land, mainly from the sale and 






downstream industry tax revenues. This can be described as follows: the local government 
broadens the tax base through the sale of industrial land and promotes local tax revenue 
increases through the expansion of urban construction and real estate development. 
 
Land leasing is the dominant source of non-tax revenue. Local governments use land ownership 
to charge land users for usage over a certain period of time. Considering the availability of data, 
and in order to obtain more comprehensive and reliable empirical results, this study measures 
land finance as the sum of land transfer payment, land value-added tax, urban land-use tax, 
farmland occupation tax, deed tax, and property tax. 
 
Model 
First, in order to analyse the relationship between land finance and fiscal decentralization level, 
the first panel data regression model is built as followed (1): 
ln 𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
Where LF is the land finance, FD is fiscal decentralization level, i indicate province and t is 
time, 𝛼0 is the intercept, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is random error term. To consider the impact of other economic 






density, urbanization rate have been included in control variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡.  
 
Then we analyse the relationship between the land finance and housing price by building a 
second panel data model. The regression model is as followed (2): 
ln 𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln 𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
Where HP is the dependent variable of housing price. 𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 are 
the variable coefficients. RIr represent the interest rate. The relationship between interest rate 
and housing price is interpreted in two different ways. One thinks that there is a negative 
correlation and lower interest rate will stimulate investment in housing market and push the 
price to increase (Shen, 2011). The other indicate the relationship is obscured by the 















The description of each variable are as followed: 
Table2 Description each variable  
Variables Representation Description Unit 
Main 
Variables 
Housing price HP 







Percentage of local per capita 
government revenue to central 
amount 
 
Land Finance LF 
Percentage of local per capita 
government revenue to central 
RMB 
(yuan) 







Administration district area 
 
Urbanization rate Urbliz 
Percentage of nonagricultural 
population in total population 
 












fully implemented the marketization of housing market. In order to ensure consistency of data, 
this study selected the relevant data from 2000 to 2009 in 31 provinces. Land tax revenue data 
were collected from the China Statistical Yearbook. Land leasing data were collected from the 
China Land and Resources Yearbook. The urbanization level is measured by the proportion of 
nonagricultural population to total population. The average selling price of commercial housing 
was taken from the China Statistical Yearbook from 2000 to 2009. The interest rate is measured 
by loan interest rate collected form the People’s Bank of China’s open data. To do the empirical 
analysis, the research chose the province-level panel data set from 31 provinces (including 
autonomous regions, municipalities cities in mainland China) from 2000 to 2009, which can 
represent the economy development of China in the early years of the 21st Century.   
 
Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
According to the transmission mechanism described in Section 4, we first analyze the 
relationship between the tax-sharing system and local land finance, and then, we analyze the 
relationship between land finance and house prices. Finally, we develop a regression analysis 









Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Property Tax 310 132416 655125 3.54E5 194556.528 
Tax on Urban Land Used 310 20098 473977 1.20E5 168401.505 
Land Appreciation Tax 310 1275 612271 1.86E5 229161.007 
Farmland Occupation Tax 310 532 1158789 1.44E5 357142.676 
Land Transfer Revenue 310 3.49E5 9.76E6 3.7278E6 2.75085E6 
Land Finance 310 5.18E5 1.13E7 4.5327E6 3.24828E6 
Average Selling Price of 
Commercial Housing 
310 3326 12364 6421.02 2739.227 
Per capital GDP 310 0.01 1.80 0.02 8.22 
Population density 310 501.2 3305.21 501.21101.2 329.21 
Interest rate 310 -0.24 9.24 4.59 1.89 
 
The housing price regression model and fiscal decentralization model is developed based on 






interest rate. All these variables describe non-stationary process. In order to avoid nonsense 
regression and to carry out co-integration analysis, we test the stability of the first order 
difference of these variables in Eview6.0 software. LLC test, IPS test and ADF test are used to 
measure the stationary of the panel data. The results of these three test is summarized in Table 
4. Test results show that all the results reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significant level. 
Thus all the variables passed the unit root test in first order difference. 
 
Table 4. Unit root test  
Variables First order difference equation 
LLC IPS ADF 
Housing price -12.422(0.01) -3.565(0.00) 12.392(0.00) 
Fiscal Decentralization -5.39(0.01) -4.87(0.01) -9.28(0.00) 
Land Finance -18.399(0.00) 4.4944(0.00) 44.913(0.00) 
Interest rate -12.342(0.01) –3.282(0.01) 50.889(0.01) 
Population density -3.25(0.00) -3.87(0.01) -12.25(0.00) 
Urbanization rate -8.113(0.01) -5.647(0.00) 95.341(0.00) 
Per capital GDP -17.232(0.00) –5.153(0.00) 61.716(0.00) 
    
 






co-integration test using Engel-Granger two-step Kao method. The test results are shown in 
table 5. The p value of two models are all significant, indicating that there is a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between variables. Thus we can process the regression analysis of 
those panel data. 
Table 5. Co-integration regression result 
 The co-integration test of 
 model (1) 




t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. 
-2.1243 0.0001 -6.2421 0 
 
Considering we are not sure whether the two models above are random effects model or fixed 
effects model, we used Hausman method to the two. The results of Hausman test are shown in 
Table 6, in which P values of the two models are less than 0.05, indicating that the hypothesis 
of the random effects is rejection, and we are able to use fix effects regression model. The 
results of the least square regression analysis are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 6. Results of Hausman test 
 Chi-Sq. Statistic Prob. 
Model1 2.1123 0.0001 









Table 7 Regression result of penal data  
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 
C 2.3745*** 9.4384*** 
LF(Land Finance) Dependent Variable  0.0021** 
FD(Fiscal decentralization) 0.0176***  
HP(Housing price)   
Pgdp(per capital GDP) 0.0192*** 1.0763*** 
Urbliz(Urbanization level) 0.0165*** 0.0584*** 
Popdes (Population density) 0.0025*** 0.0235*** 
Rlr (Interest rate)  0.0805*** 
Note:*, **, and ***denote statistics are significant under the level of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
 
Through observing the coefficients in the model 1, we can find the per capital GDP and 
urbanization level have a positive impact on the land finance level. The result indicates that 
rapid urbanization development create the demand for the revenue to fuel the infrastructure 
construction and drive local government to sell more land to collected related tax. On the other 
hand, higher urbanization level means more agricultural population have move into urban areas 
and turned into nonagricultural population, further increase the demand like social warfare 






coefficient. This indicates that Fiscal decentralization has a significantly positive effect on land 
finance, which supports the H1 in Section 3. According to the regression results of the model 
2, land finance has significant positive effect on housing price, the regression coefficient is 
0.0021 (p<5%). Thus, this validates H2. In an economic sense, land is a scarce resource; 
meanwhile, in order to obtain more “land revenue,” governments will increase the practice of 
land leasing, thereby raising housing prices.  
 
Chapter 6 Conclusion  
China’s housing price has experience a rapid growth over the last two decades. Different from 
western countries with mature housing market, affecting factors that influence China’s housing 
price largely come from government policy. Existing studies focused on the influence from 
current policy changes, but they lack a comprehensive framework for the theoretical analysis 
of the whole system. Based on the theoretical deduction that fiscal decentralization is related 
to rising housing prices, this study combines tax-sharing reform, land finance, and housing 
prices in the same analytic framework. The empirical analysis was carried out using panel data 
from 31 provinces between 2000 and 2009. The results showed that fiscal decentralization 
against a background of tax sharing is the institutional factor that leads local governments to 






local governments have a significantly positive effect on the rise of urban housing prices in 
China. Thus, it can be concluded that the tax system used for China’s urban housing prices is 
behind the phenomenon of China’s rising housing prices, which, in turn, inform important 
policies. Thus, we can conclude that the tax-sharing system is an important policy factor that 
has contributed to the phenomenon of China’s rising urban housing prices. 
 
The regulations and reforms of China’s real estate market are part of a systematic project. 
Policy regulations in relation to housing prices, taxation, and affordable housing supply should 
depend on greater reforms of the financial system. Attention should be paid to the fiscal 
relationships between central and local governments; local governments’ financial situations 
should be acknowledged, and the distribution of powers and responsibilities should be 
reasonably adjusted. By implementing reforms of the tax system, the current financial focus 
can move to the central government rather than local governments; the irrational division of 
financial and administrative powers can be revised by eliminating the intrinsic motivation to 
overtax land finance and promoting the healthy development of the real estate industry. We 
offer the following three suggestions: 
 
1. Ensure the reasonable redistribution of financial rights and increase local fiscal revenue 






example, the distributed proportion between the central government and local governments in 
relation to corporate income tax is 60–40. However, income tax from corporations that have 
complex systems of tax management could be redirected to local governments so as to solve 
contradictions of power and responsibility. At the same time, personal income tax could be 
handled by the central government; this would be consistent with the current reality of the free 
movement of labor. In this way, local fiscal revenue would significantly improve. 
 
2. Enhance the central government’s expenditure responsibilities 
According to international practice and the basic theory of public economics, public 
expenditure on social security should be provided by the central government. In this way, the 
central government should be able to afford social security expenditure, pension and relief 
expenses, retirement funds, medical insurance expenses, etc. to reduce the burden of local 
finance. This would then avoid an excessive reliance on land finance. 
 
3. Reform land finance  
Local governments have become accustomed to receiving land finance, even though the tax 
reform to increase local revenue has made it difficult for local governments to give this up and 
relinquish their control of housing prices. Therefore, in order to fundamentally dispel the 






should be collected as national taxes, and the full amount should be transferred via returns to 
local governments through transfer payments, thus earmarking the way toward affordable 
housing. In this way, land prices not only can be controlled, but the scale of affordable housing 
can also be expanded. 
 
In the final, several limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First is the data accuracy. 
Although the data used in this paper is collected from the National Bureau of Statistics in China, 
the statistic may not accurate because of the delay in the standardization development in the 
Bureau of Statistics. The data from the local statistical bureau sometimes is not consistent with 
data from the national statistics bureau. In addition, this study only provides a general idea to 
alleviate the negative influence of fiscal decentralization. The exhaustive policy proposal 
should also consider different factors from the field of economics, geography, and politics. 
These research limitations in the paper provide scholars interested in the related area with ideas 
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